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of uncertainty in his alcohol concentration result from his driving under
influence prosecution. In his opening brief, he asked that the Idaho Supreme Court
retain this case so that it could reconsider its decision in Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department

of Transportation, 153 Idaho 200 (2012), which incorrectly held that I.C. § 18-8004(4)
("Subsection (4)") makes the measurement of uncertainty in alcohol concentration tests
irrelevant to, and inadmissible in, DUI cases.

In response, the State relies on red

herrings, circular reasoning, and a clear misunderstanding of the science at issue here
to argue that Elias-Cruz was correctly decided

This reply brief discusses a handful of

flaws and shortcomings in the State's arguments and Elias-Cruz's reasoning that
deserve more explanation.

1

ISSUE

2

ARGUMENT

Alcohol Concentration Test Results Because I.C. § 18-8004 And I.C. § 18-8004C
Criminalize Driving With An Actual Alcohol Concentration Above The Legal Limit, Not
Merely Driving With A Test Result Above The Legal Limit
In his opening brief, Mr. Jones asked this Court to reexamine and overturn its
decision in Elias-Cruz because that Court decided the meaning of Subsection (4) based
on legislative history, without ever analyzing the plain, unambiguous language of
Subsection (4), and because the plain language, legislative history, legislative purpose,
and internal requirements of Subsection (4) itself undermine Elias-Cruz's interpretation
of Subsection (4).
In response, the State argues that Mr. Jones "has failed to show the Elias-Cruz
decision is manifestly unjust and should be overturned." (Resp. Br., p. 12 (capitalization
altered).)

First, Mr. Jones argued that Elias-Cruz is manifestly wrong, not manifestly

unjust (App. Br., p.7.) And the State's arguments in favor of Elias-Cruz-which rely
primarily on red herrings, circular reasoning (Elias-Cruz is right because of Elias-Cruz),
and a clear misunderstanding of the science at issue here-only highlight that Elias-

Cruz was incorrectly decided.
Crucially,

the

majority

of

the

State's

arguments

turn

on

Elias-Cruz's

misinterpretation of the 1987 amendment to Subsection (4). The State claims that, by
removing the language "is a determination of the percent by weight of alcohol in the
blood" from Subsection (4), the legislature not only removed the requirement that breath
or urine results be converted to blood results (as Mr. Jones contends), but also
rendered the driver's actual alcohol concentration irrelevant. As discussed at length in
Mr. Jones's opening brief and reiterated in this reply brief, Elias-Cruz and the State
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something into

amendment

is not there. This Court

uld

reverse
in

The Plain Language, Legislative Amendments, And Legislative Purpose Of The
DUI Statutes Unequivocally Criminalize Driving With An Alcohol Concentration
Above The Legal Limit, Not Merely A Test Result Above The Legal Limit
The plain language and legislative history of LC. § 18-8004C(2) and Subsection
(4) shows that Elias-Cruz misinterpreted those statutes.

First, according to the plain

language of Subsection (4), Subsection (4) it is merely a rule of evidence that allows the
State to introduce certain alcohol concentration test results without a witness.

(App.

Br., pp.10-13.) Second, the 1987 amendment only removed the requirement that urine
and breath results be converted to blood results; it did not change that the alcohol
concentration, not merely the test result, is criminalized. (App. Br., pp.13-15.) Third,
the statement of purpose to the 1987 amendment supports Mr. Jones's reading of the
DUI statutes:

"Section 18-8004 is amended to clarify the definition of alcohol

concentration. An illegal concentration is required for a person to be in violation of the
law." (See App. Br., p.13 (quoting App. Br., App'x A, p.6, Statement of Purpose, H.R.

119, 49th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (1987) (emphasis added)).)
In its response brief, the State addresses the plain language and legislative
history together, focusing the bulk of its argument on the legislative amendments and
wholly failing to address the express legislative purpose of the 1987 amendment.
(See Resp. Br., pp.12-16.) Regarding the plain language, the State only asserts that
the language of Subsection (4), "combined with the plain language of I.C. § 188004C(2), shows that 'alcohol concentration' refers only to the results of the particular
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(4).

on

(Resp. Br.,

1

5.)

§ 1

§

18-8004C(2) criminalizes

driving

with

"an

alcohol concentration"

"a test result") of at least .20, "as defined in subsection (4) ... as shown by analysis
of his blood, urine, or breath . . . .

(Emphasis added). Had the legislature intended to

criminalize the mere fact of driving with a test result over .20, it would have said so. For
example, I.C. § 18-8002A(4)(a) allows the Department of Transportation to suspend a
driver's license if, among other things. ''the person submitted to a test and the test

results indicated an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating
substances .

..

(Emphasis added). Here, the legislature clearly criminalized driving

with a particular alcohol concentration, which is shown by one of three different types of
tests. It did not criminalize merely driving with a particular test result.
In addressing the plain language, the State contends:

"Without explanation

[Mr.] Jones repeatedly adds the word 'actual' to create the phrase 'actual alcohol
concentration,' which seems to denote actual or true blood alcohol concentration ....
However, the word 'actual' does not appear in the relevant statutes.
rephrasing of the statutory language is simply not accurate."

[Mr.] Jones'

(Resp. Br., p.13.)

Mr. Jones only uses that term to distinguish the actual alcohol concentration in ones'
blood, breath, or urine from a test result evidencing that alcohol concentration. Again,
the DUI statutes criminalize driving with an "alcohol concentration," not driving with a
"test result." This is important because, as undisputed by the State, a driver's actual
alcohol concentration may vary by five percent from the test result.
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(R., p.92;

Therefore, Mr. Jones's test result of .207 means Mr. Jones is just as likely to
.1

or

17 as he is

an alcohol concentration

'p.
Regarding the 1987 amendment, the State claims that removing the language "is
a determination of the percent by weight of alcohol in the blood" from Subsection (4)
both removed the requirement that breath or urine results be converted to blood results
and also rendered the driver's actual alcohol concentration irrelevant. (Resp. Br., p.15.)

Before 1987, Subsection (4) read:
For purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration
is a determination of the percent by weight of alcohol in blood and shall be
based upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic
centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or sixtyseven (67) milliliters of urine.
Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 204. And after 1987, Subsection (4) read:

For purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration
shall be based upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100)
cubic centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or
sixty-seven (67) milliliters of urine ....
I.C. § 18-8004(4). As discussed in Mr. Jones's opening brief, the 1987 amendments
changed only the requirement that measurements of alcohol in urine or breath be
converted into a measurement of alcohol in blood. 1 (App. Br., pp.13-15.) The State,

relying exclusively on circular reasoning and Elias-Cruz, attempts to conflate that

The State frames this argument as a concession on Mr. Jones's part. (See Resp. Br.,
p.14 (quoting App. Br., p.14).)
Acknowledging the actual effect of the 1987
amendments-which only changed the requirement that measurements of alcohol in
urine or breath be converted into a measurement of alcohol in blood-is not a
concession. Mr. Jones did not conceded-because the 1987 amendments did not
change-that the DUI statutes still criminalize driving with an actual alcohol
concentration above the legal limit, not merely driving with a test result above the legal
limit.
1
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change that is

not reflected in the

a

result
2

rt

re-insert the phrase deleted by the 1987 amendment to [Subsection (4)]-'is a
determination of the percent by weight of alcohol in blood . .

"' (Resp. Br., p.15.)

Given that Mr. Jones is not arguing that a breath or urine result still needs to be
converted into a blood result-which was all that the 1987 amendments changedMr. Jones's reading of the statute would not require the Court to re-insert the above
language as the State claims.
Similarly, the State questions what Mr. Jones meant when he used the term
"body" when discussing the 1987 amendment.

(See Resp. Br., p 14 (quoting App.

Br., p.14 ("[T]his shows that the legislature intended to remove the requirement that
measurements of alcohol in breath or urine be converted into measurements of alcohol
in blood, but still keep the requirement that the driver have an alcohol concentration
The State posits: "If ... 'body' refers to

over a certain amount in his or her body.

'breath, blood, and urine,' the only measurements of alcohol concentration possible are
the test results produced by whatever type of analysis is performed. If there is some
other measurement of alcohol concentration that is relevant, [Mr.] Jones has failed to
identify it." (Resp. Br., p.14.) The State again overlooks the fact that the measurement
of uncertainty-which

gives

a

range

of measurements

of the

actual alcohol

2 The State also fails to explain how the 1987 amendments to I.C. § 18-8004(1 )-(3),
which deleted "by weight, of alcohol in his blood' and inserted "an alcohol
concentration" and "as defined in subsection (4) of this section," made only the test
result relevant. (See app. Br., p.14.)
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in a subjects blood, breath, or

precisely "some other

that is
are all
is in fact required by Subsection (4). (See App. Br., pp.15-17; see also infra pp.7-9.)
Finally, the State repeatedly cites to Elias-Cruz's statement that, after the 1987
amendment, "[t]here is nothing to which to compare the test results."

(See Resp.

Br., pp.14 n.9, 17, 18 (quoting Elias-Cruz, 153 Idaho at 204).) This statement seems to
indicate that, before 1987, the test results were compared to the alcohol concentration
in the blood. This is incorrect. Again, because the pre-1987 Subsection (4) provided
that alcohol concentration "is a determination of the percent by weight of alcohol in the
blood," Subsection (4) required that breath and urine results be converted to blood

results.

There was thus no "comparison" to be made. And, regardless of the 1987

amendment, the test results still attempt to measure the actual alcohol concentration in
a driver's body-whether measured by urine, breath, or blood.
The plain language of the DUI statutes, as well as the legislative amendments
and purpose, allow for only one reading of those statutes.

I.C. § 18-8004C(2) and

Subsection (4) criminalizes driving with an "alcohol concentration" above .20, not merely
driving with a test result above .20.

B.

Elias-Cruz's Reading Of Subsection (4) Nullifies Subsection (4)'s Requirement
That Alcohol Concentration Tests Comply With Certain Standard Operating
Procedures, Which In Turn Require That Alcohol Concentration Test Results
Include The Measurement Of Uncertainty

The internal inconsistencies created by Elias-Cruz's reading of Subsection (4)
further show Elias-Cruz misinterpreted Subsection (4). Specifically, Subsection (4) itself

8

that

include

alcohol concentration

in

1

The State counters that Elias-Cruz has not nullified parts of Subsection (4) by
rendering the requirements of the standard operating procedures irrelevant The State
first claims that "it was the Idaho Legislature, not the Idaho Supreme Court, which
rendered the margin of error and measurement of uncertainty irrelevant and
inadmissible in court." (Resp. Br., p.17.) The State's arguments on this point depend
on its earlier arguments about the effect of the 1987 amendments, and thus fail for the
same reasons.
The State goes on to contend that "because the measurement of uncertainty was
typewritten on [Mr.] Jones's lab report, the Standard Operating Procedures were, in fact,
followed."

(Resp. Br., p.18.)

This argument, if accepted, would mean that the

requirements in the standard operating procedures (and therefore Subsection (4)'s
requirements) are nothing more than an exercise in futility-something the labs must do
for no reason at all.

It also ignores that, according to the standard operating

procedures, the measurement of uncertainty "is crucial to the legal system because it
impacts if and how an individual will be charged with an offense such as a DUI."
(R., p.116.) Again, this only highlights the disconnect between Elias-Cruz's erroneous

interpretation of Subsection (4) and Subsection (4) itself.
Finally, the State asserts that the measurement of uncertainty is irrelevant
because "it could not have established the reliability of the testing procedure."
(Resp. Br., p.18.)

As an initial matter, the State's argument rests on the erroneous
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that the measurement of uncertainty would only be relevant if it could
Jones
testing

does

Instead, the measurement of uncertainty gives the full picture-the range of values,
each of which is just as likely as the other to be the true value of the thing that is
measured. The measurement of uncertainty
incorporates, reconceptualizes, and expands upon error analysis. . . .
[M]easurement uncertainty ... is a quantifiable parameter in the realm of
the state of knowledge about nature. The objective of measurement
uncertainty is not to approximate a quantity's value as closely as possible
but to characterize our state of knowledge about a quantity's value.
Ted Vosk, Measurement Uncertainty: Requirement for Admission of Forensic Science

Evidence, in Wiley Encyclopedia of Forensic Science, 3-4 (A. Jamieson and A.
Moenssens eds., 2015) (internal endnote and quotation marks omitted).

For this

reason, the standard operating procedures provide:
In the analysis of forensic specimens, we do not know the true value for
the specimen; hence, this information is not the error associated with the
analysis. Rather, it is a range of values likely to be encountered during
the measurement process. This information is crucial to the legal system
because it impacts if and how an individual will be charged with an offense
such as a DUI.
(R., p.116 (emphasis added).) The measurement of uncertainty thus reflects the fact

that Mr. Jones's test result of .207 means that his actual alcohol concentration may be
as low as. 196 or as high as .217, and that it is equally likely that his actual alcohol
concentration is 196, .207, or .217. (R., p.92; PSI, p.55.)
The State's arguments, much like Elias-Cruz, turn on its incorrect interpretation
of the 1987 amendments.

That interpretation conflates the actual effect of the

amendments (which removed the requirement that breath and urine results be
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results) with something

only Elias-Cruz

(the false

a
from

a

concentration irrelevant). The plain language of I.C. § 18-8004C(2) and Subsection (4),
the internal inconsistencies created by Elias-Cruz, and the express legislative purpose
of those amendments further shows that the State's and Elias-Cruz's reading of the

1987 amendments is incorrect.

The State has not and cannot square all of those

elements with its reading of the DUI statutes, while Mr. Jones's reading accounts for
each and every one of them. Elias-Cruz is manifestly wrong and must be overturned.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Jones respectfully requests that this Court overturn Elias-Cruz, vacate
Mr. Jones's judgment of conviction, reverse the district court's orders granting the
State's motion in limine and denying his motion for reconsideration, and order that the
district court admit the measurement of uncertainty at trial.
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2015.

MAYA P\:
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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